COMMENTARY
Page presents a much-needed analysis of trade-offs between models such as Back Propagation (BP) which use purely feedforward yet non-local interactions, and models such as Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) which use both feedforward and feedback interactions that obey local constraints. It needs to be emphasized that "localist" models do not necessarily compute winner-take-all categories, even though such categories have powerful computational properties; e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg (1991) . A key concern is that distributed models such as BP are defined by mechanisms whose information is not locally computed with respect to the underlying network architecture. This is biologically implausible and also hampers their implementation as VLSI chips.
Masking Fields Grossberg, 1986, 1987; Grossberg, 1978 Grossberg, , 1986 provided one early example of a competitive "localist" network which does not necessarily compute winner-take-all categories. Rather, it is a multiple-scale network that can "weigh the evidence" for representing multiple parts of an input pattern, with the various part representations activated to different degrees. Masking fields were introduced to explain how, under unsupervised learning conditions, an unfamiliar grouping of familiar items can ever overcome the salience of the familiar item representations so that a new representation of the unfamiliar grouping can be learned. This problem arises in both visual object recognition and speech recognition. A masking field does this by giving the chunks that represent larger groupings, up to some maximal length, a pre-wired competitive advantage over those that represent smaller groupings. It was shown how this bias could develop from simple developmental growth laws (Cohen and Grossberg, 1986) . The network clarifies how the most predictive chunk can be maximally activated, while less predictive chunks are less activated, and chunks with insufficient evidence are merely primed. Such a network naturally explains such data as the Magic Number Seven (Grossberg, 1978 (Grossberg, , 1986 Miller, 1956) , and predicted data about the word length effect (Samuel, van Santen, and Johnston, 1982 , !983) which shows that a letter can be progressively better recognized when it is embedded in longer words of lengths from I to 4. This is the speech analog of the word superiority effect, which it also explains, unlike the Seidenberg and McClelland (1989) model. Masking fields have recently been used, within an ART framework, to quantitatively explain data about how future word sounds can reorganize conscious percepts of earlier word sounds (Grossberg and Myers, 1999; Repp eta/., 1978) . None of the distributed models mentioned by Page can explain these data. More recent developments of ART continue to analyze how a network can automatically discover, through incremental learning in real time, the optimal level of compression with which to represent different input environments.
Page mentions "binding" as one means of generating distributed representations. One mechanism for this are the horizontal connections that exist in neocortex, notably in layers 2/3. Recent modeling work has clarified how bottom-up, horizontal, and top-down interactions interact within the laminar circuits of neocortex, notably visual cortex, to bind together distributed activations into coherent boundary representations (Grossberg, 1999; Grossberg and Raizada, 1999) . This work opens the way towards the very large task of showing how distributed information may be coherently bound in other parts of sensory and cognitive neocortex.
Page notes that both view-specific and view-invariant representations of familiar objects can be found in IT cortex. Such representations have been shown to self-organize in a number of ART -based models; see Bradski and Grossberg (1995) for one such model and related references. A key issue here is that working memories play a useful role in generating these representations. These working memories are "distributed", yet are also clearly localist.
Page quotes the assertion of McClelland and Rumelhart ( 1981; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1982) that their Interactive Activation (IA) model is a canonical model "that characterizes the qualitative behavior of other models". Actually, the original IA model had serious defects. These defects illustrate that all localist models are not created equal, and that one must exercise as much caution in choosing among them as one does between localist and non-local distributed models. In particular, I early noted that the IA model had unrealistic processing levels (phonemes, letters, words) and bottom-up input pathways (both excitatory and inhibitory). These properties were inconsistent with key data, and prevented the model from being able to stably learn from its inputs -even though the authors did not attempt to make the IA model learn (Grossberg, 1984 (Grossberg, , 1987 . Later versions of the model changed these properties to be consistent with previously published ART properties; e.g., those in Grossberg (1978) . In this sense, the IA model is dead, and has been subsumed by ART. Problems within models like IA can lead people who prefer non-local distributed models to conclude that their models are better. A more proper conclusion is that IA was not an adequate model, localist or not.
Page provides a useful critique of the McClelland, McNaughton, and O'Reilly (1995) attempt to explain how interactions between the hippocampus and neocortex may control learning and memory. He leaves out at least one issue that I find devastating to all models of this type. Grossberg and Merrill (1996) provide a critique which bnilds upon this concern. It involves the issue of representation, which is key to all discussions of localist vs distributed coding. In particular, this model proposes that the hippocampus rapidly encodes information which is then later transferred to neocortex. But there is no evidence of which I am aware that the hippocampus can represent the types of information from vision, audition, etc. that would need to be represented there for this proposal to be plausible. Saying that the information is represented by hippocampus in compressed form does not help, because then one needs to explain how it gets decompressed in the cortex. I am amazed that authors of such models have not bothered to respond to this critique. I hope that it does not take as long as it took the stability-plasticity issues to get discussed which were introduced with ART in 1976.
